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Abstract: Cybersecurity has become a crucial challenge in the automotive sector. At the current 
stage, the framework described by the ISO/SAE 21434 is insufficient to derive concrete methods 
for the design of secure automotive networked embedded systems on the supplier level. This 
article describes a case study with actionable steps for designing secure systems and 
systematically eliciting traceable cybersecurity requirements to address this gap. The case study 
is aligned with the ISO/SAE 21434 standard and can provide the basis for integrating 
cybersecurity engineering into company-specific processes and practice specifications. 
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1 Introduction  
Vehicles are moving from isolated and mostly electro-mechanical systems towards 
connected computers with wheels [Ebert 2009]. This trend is driven by the wish of the 
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automotive industry to offer innovative mobility services and further progress towards 
partially and fully automated vehicles. These goals are most probably only reachable 
with cooperative and automated vehicles [EC 2016]. Nevertheless, to achieve safe, 
automated, and interacting vehicles, cybersecurity needs to be further improved [BMW 
2019][Macher 2019 2]. 
Recent evaluations and disclosures presented multiple vulnerabilities in almost all 
connected elements in current vehicles [Miller 2015][Ring 2015][Strobel 2018], as 
shown by the following example: Today, car manufacturers act as local internet 
registries (LIR) and maintain a cluster of IP addresses, certificates, and certificate 
management systems to secure remote access to external infrastructure and services 
from vehicles in their fleets. To that purpose, modern vehicles use a Linux-based 
gateway server to implement remote access to external services. Each vehicle's gateway 
server is configured with individual key material and certificates during the End-of-
Line (EOL) production process. Besides the gateway servers, vehicles offer various 
other protocols to access on-board functions such as the on-board diagnostics (OBD) 
interface and services, WLAN, Bluetooth, and dedicated Vehicle2X communication 
protocols. These connectivity features broaden the attack surface of modern vehicles, 
making them susceptible to attacks from outside [Macher 2017, Macher 2017 2, Macher 
2019, Messnarz 2017, Messnarz 2020]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of a multi-layer remote cybersecurity attack on connected vehicles 
Figure 1 shows such a remote cybersecurity attack that was successfully executed 
on a vehicle available on the market [Miller 2015]. In this multi-layer attack, 
vulnerabilities in the remote interfaces are exploited to gain access to the vehicle's on-
board functions, ultimately leading to unwanted vehicle steering. The depicted attack 
consists of the following steps: 
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1. Information disclosure: In the first step, attackers use the same vehicle model 
for attack preparation. By sniffing vehicle bus messages via the OBD 
interface, the attackers can learn the specifics of the bus communication (i.e., 
parts of the message catalog). In addition, the IP address cluster used by the 
vehicle manufacturer can be identified. For a subsequent attack, the specific 
IP address of the vehicle under attack is obtained by sniffing the 
communication between the target vehicle and the vehicle owner's 
smartphone. 
2. Elevation of privilege: In the next step, the known vulnerabilities of the Linux 
gateway's firewall are exploited to gain root privileges enabling the attacker 
to gain access to the vehicle's internal network. At this stage, it is possible to 
use the gateway to send malicious commands to the internal vehicle network 
from a remote device and deploy malicious software on the gateway. 
3. Spoofing: In the final step, the vehicle is attacked by executing a script 
previously deployed on the gateway. This script sends messages to the 
vehicle's internal network containing malicious but appropriately assembled 
steering control commands and vehicle speed information. The message 
structure was identified in the first attack step and is now used in a so-called 
spoofing attack to emulate the behavior/messages of other bus participants. In 
the specific example, the emulated vehicle speed information (i.e., the vehicle 
is driving at a speed less than 5 km/h) tricks the steering control unit (SCU) to 
accept steering commands from the parking assistance control unit (PACU), 
even in a high-speed driving situation. Finally, enabling the attacker to steer 
the vehicle remotely. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Nowadays, only a limited number of gateway server development companies closely 
cooperate with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in designing the vehicle 
electrical/electronic (E/E) architecture and the vehicle-fleet security service 
architecture (SSA). Therefore, most automotive development is still related to 
delivering electronically controlled networked embedded vehicle functions that 
implement, e.g., vehicle steering, acceleration, and braking.  
These functions need to be integrated into the SSA and E/E architecture in a secure 
manner to mitigate emerging security threats. Cybersecurity is thus becoming a 
cornerstone for the success of the automotive industry, alongside reliability and safety. 
This fact is mirrored in recent cybersecurity regulations that require proof of 
cybersecurity to introduce vehicle types to the market (i.e., UNECE Type Approval, 
particularly UNECE WP.29 / R155 and UNECE WP.29 / R.156). 
In that respect, the automotive industry has advanced developing and implementing 
secure connected vehicles by leveraging experience from other sectors. However, the 
sector is still facing several specific challenges. Therefore, there is a considerable drive 
towards developing industry standards that address cybersecurity engineering to protect 
modern connected vehicles and the mobility infrastructure against cyberattacks 
[Schmittner 2019]. 
While these standards do not offer details on the development and implementation 
of cybersecurity, they represent a framework that provides general guidance. The 
upcoming ISO/SAE 21434 standard for road vehicle cybersecurity engineering was 
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developed with the understanding that for large parts of the cybersecurity process 
activities, there is a lack of established state of the art. Therefore only a framework can 
be given in the standard. This framework needs to be completed in the future to provide 
concrete guidance for establishing a secure development process. 
1.2 Objective 
This article aims to propose actionable steps and methods that are aligned with the 
automotive domain standards and regulations applicable to the secure design of 
electronically controlled networked vehicle functions. These steps should complement 
the standards and provide engineers practical guidance on the development of secure 
vehicle functions. The focus of this work is on engineering aspects, including the risk-
driven system design and the systematic elicitation of requirements addressing the 
identified cybersecurity risks at different stages in the automotive development 
workflow. The workflow steps addressed include the system and architecture design 
phase, the HW/SW design phase, and the HW/SW detailed design phase, as shown in 
Figure 2. The case study shall demonstrate the application of security-driven analysis 
methods to create the necessary evidence (i.e., work products) to elicit cybersecurity 
requirements supported by a solid evidence-based and standard-aligned argument. 
 
 
Figure 2: Cybersecurity development workflow and supporting work products 
1.3 Case Study  
The case study focuses on the development of a steering control unit (SCU) responsible 
for controlling vehicle steering. The SCU is highlighted in Figure 3, which exemplifies 
the scope of a typical automotive Tier 1 project targeted towards the development of a 
specific vehicle function. From a security point of view, the SCU shall be designed to 
be integrated into the given E/E architecture securely. 
As depicted in Figure 3 and introduced at the beginning of Section 1, modern 
connected vehicles use gateway servers to establish remote connections to, e.g., 
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roadside infrastructure and other vehicles. Today's vehicle E/E architectures cluster the 
on-board communication network into different subnetwork domains to separate the 
safety-critical networked vehicle functions from minor or non-critical entertainment 
and communication functions. Nevertheless, to ensure proper operation of the overall 
vehicle, the individual electronic control units (ECUs), responsible for controlling and 
coordinating the overall vehicle behavior, must be interconnected. To that purpose, the 
gateway server and the subnetwork domain controllers are interconnected via real-time 
Ethernet, CAN FD, or both. The individual ECUs within a specific network domain 
still rely on CAN FD communication to guarantee short start-up times and real-time 
control in millisecond time frames. 
 
 
Figure 3: Typical supplier integration into a secure service architecture (SSA) 
This clear separation into different network domains provides additional layers of 
defense against cyber-attacks. It also allows using already established automotive 
development processes and tools for the engineering of safety-critical electronically 
controlled vehicle functions. However, no established best-practices guidelines or 
security engineering processes for secure system design exist in the automotive domain. 
Hence, the automotive suppliers have to adapt their development lifecycles to also 
integrate cybersecurity engineering aspects into their processes landscape [ISO 21434 
2020][ASPICE 2021][Messnarz 2016][Messnarz 2017][Riel 2018]. 
In the remainder of this work, the proposed security-driven engineering steps and 
methods for such an adaptation are described. These steps and methods are aligned to 
the ISO/SAE 21434 standard [ISO 21434 2020] (DIS version available since Feb. 
2020). The main normative activities required by the standard include the item 
definition and the threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA). 
The item definition of the electronically controlled electric power steering system 
is shown in Figure 4. It defines the project scope and the scope of the case study. In 
addition, it describes the system components and the internal and external interfaces of 
the system under development (SUD) on a conceptual level. From a security 
perspective, the item definition can support the systematic identification of critical 
assets. According to ISO/SAE 21434, an asset is defined as an element of the SUD 
whose compromise of cybersecurity properties may damage an item's stakeholder, i.e., 
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a person or organization affected by the damage. Hence, elements in the item definition 
are often identified as assets that need protection because a successful attack on them 
typically significantly impacts the vehicle's functionality, safety, or cybersecurity. 
 
 
Figure 4: Item definition of the steering control unit (SCU) 
The case study example is based on two parallel operating 3-phase motors, each 
mounted on the steering rack. Two master/slave processing units, both developed 
according to ASIL D constraints, are used to control the 3-phase motors. The processing 
units are connected to the vehicle bus for information exchange with other ECUs. The 
cybersecurity-critical system assets in the given item definition are labeled Axx and are 
clustered into groups. The system architecture present is designed to meet the safety 
and fail-operational requirements of modern highly-automated vehicles [Dobaj 
2020][Macher 2019 3][Messnarz 2019] [Veledar 2019]. 
2 System-Level Cybersecurity Engineering 
A general strategy in cybersecurity engineering is related to the fact that every 
accessible system interface increases the potential attack surfaces. Hence, the better 
understanding of system interfaces and their associated cybersecurity threats, the higher 
the likelihood of appropriately addressing cybersecurity risks and defending the system 
when under attack. In addition, the analysis of potential attack paths starting at the 
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interface level helps to understand and assess risks and the impact of attacks on 
stakeholders. 
2.1 TARA Preparation 
The threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) goal is to identify potential 
cybersecurity threats of the SUD and the subsequent assessment of risks associated with 
the identified threats. Before conducting the TARA, some pre-analysis steps shall be 
performed, including (a) the cybersecurity item definition described in the previous 
section, the derivation of additional information from (b) the critical function block 
analysis, which describes the primary system functions, (c) the analysis of the 
technology stack in use, detailing the hardware and software building blocks for 
implementing specific cybersecurity mechanisms, and (d) threat modeling to represent 
the adversarial cyber threats inherent to every cyber(-physical) system. 
These pre-analysis steps help obtain a broader understanding of the system, its 
potential attack interfaces, and the required knowledge and technical skills an attacker 
may need to achieve its goal. In addition, system assets and cybersecurity-related risks 
can be elaborated more appropriately, which also facilitates the proper definition of 
cybersecurity goals and the selection of mitigation measures. 
In short, before conducting the TARA, first, the system assets shall be identified 
using the (semi) structured approaches (a) to (d). In the following, the outcome of these 
approaches is explained. 
Figure 5 shows an excerpt of assets identified through the cybersecurity item 
definition, critical function analysis, and technology stack analysis. The resulting 
system-level asset list includes, e.g., interfaces, firmware, configuration data, 
cryptographic key material, function blocks, sensors, and actuators. The asset analysis 
is the primary input to the subsequent TARA. 
 
Figure 5: Excerpt of the asset list 
The system-level threat model (level 0 threat model) supports developing a 
representation of adversarial threats inherent to the SUD. Thus, system-level threat 
models are valuable tools for structuring and guiding the asset identification process. 
In addition, threat models facilitate the systematic (and automated) derivation of 
potential threats associated with each element in the model. The aim, therefore, is that 
system-level threat models shall be developed to represent the system-level assets (e.g., 
data storages, data flows, services, people, and functions) identified during the previous 
brainstorming-like steps and missing elements/assets shall be added. 
The system-level threat model of the SCU is exemplified in Figure 6. It reflects the 
system structure of the item definition and including the previously identified asset 
groups. The depicted threat model is based on the STRIDE approach and allows only a 
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limited set of model elements, which reduces the model complexity and enables the 
automated derivation of threats associated with each model element representing a 
potential system asset. 
 
Figure 6: Level 0 threat model of the steering control system 
Initially intended for IT system threat analysis, the STRIDE approach has been 
adopted for automotive applications [Macher 2019] [Messnarz 2020]. Tabel1 gives an 
overview of the STRIDE threats, the cybersecurity property affected by a specific 
threat, and an automotive-specific example for each threat group. Using the STRIDE 
approach, threats applicable to specific elements/assets contained within the system-
level threat model can be (automatically) identified. The risk associated with each threat 





Property Threat Example 
Spoofing Authentication: Imitation of 
something/someone different 
An ECU pretends to be a different ECU by 
sending CAN-messages with a sender-ID 
of another ECU 
Tampering Integrity: Manipulation of 
data at rest (e.g., code) or in 
transition (e.g., CAN-msgs.) 
Unprotected CAN-messages may be 
intercepted, changed/manipulated, and 
resent. 
Repudiation Non-Repudiation: Claim to 
have something (not) done 
An ECU could claim to have sent a 
message even this is not true by, e.g., 
changing log files. 
Information 
Disclosure 
Confidentiality: Disclosure of 
secret information 
A communication protocol may leak 
confidential information or key material. 
Denial of 
service 
Availability: Denial or 
degradation of a service 
An ECU continuously holds the CAN bus 
data lines "high". 
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2.2 TARA Execution 
The threat analysis and risk assessment (TARA) shall be performed based on identified 
assets and associated threats. A schema shall be used to classify threats and to estimate 
and classify the threat risk appropriately. Since the ISO/SAE 21434 does not provide a 
normative classification schema for risk assessment, methods such as Heavens 
[Mafijul, 2014] or SAHARA [Macher et.al. 2015] may be applied. In this work, the 
TARA steps are based on the Heavens method. The TARA execution's individual steps 
and work products are shown in Figure 7 to Figure 11.  
Figure 7 shows an excerpt of an asset description, the STRIDE threats applicable 
to the assets, and the description of specific threat scenarios. For each asset, multiple 
STRIDE threats may be applicable. Plausible threat scenarios shall be derived from the 
system-level threat model and described for each applicable threat. 
In the particular example shown in Figure 7, the steering angle request transmitted 
by the ADAS domain controller via the vehicle bus depicts the asset to be analyzed. 
This asset is modeled in Figure 6 as a data flow element that is part of the asset group 
A01. According to the STRIDE approach, the following three threats apply to a data 
flow (i.e., the asset to be analyzed): tampering, information disclosure, and denial of 
service (TID). Figure 7 describes two threat scenarios, one for the tampering and one 
for the information disclosure threat. In general, a threat scenario description shall not 
contain (technical) details of the envisioned attack. Instead, a threat scenario shall be a 
high-level description of an envisioned threat that shall be checked for its plausibility 
using the threat models created. 
 
 
Figure 7: Threat scenario description 
The impact on stakeholders (i.e., the impact level (IL)) and the likelihood of a 
successful attack (i.e., the threat level (TL)) shall be estimated for each threat scenario. 
The two obtained ratings are combined to a single risk value (i.e., the security level 
(SecL)) that classifies the risk of a specific threat scenario and its associated asset (i.e., 
the risk linked to a specific asset and threat pair). 
To appropriately estimate the impact of a specific threat scenario on stakeholders, 
it is recommended to define potential damage scenarios describing the anticipated 
damage to the system and the effect on stakeholders. An example of such a damage 
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Figure 8: Description of potential damage scenarios for impact analysis 
The Heavens method uses four classification parameters to estimate the damage 
scenario's impact and the expected loss for different stakeholders: (a) impact on system 
safety, (b) financial impact, (c) impact on vehicle operation/behavior/function, and (d) 
privacy and legislative impacts. These impacts are estimated using a qualitative scale 
from 'no impact' to 'high impact' and are then combined to the final impact level rating. 
An example classification of the "Unwanted steering/vehicle behavior" damage 
scenario, including a justification, is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Classification of a damage scenario's impact level rating 
In general, identified damage scenarios can be mapped to multiple asset/threat pairs 
and their associated threat scenarios. The damage/impact analysis solely considers the 
most severe damage scenarios. Consequently, the highest impact level rating is 
assigned to the specific threat scenario, as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: Linking of potential damage scenarios to threat scenarios 
Besides the impact rating, the likelihood of a successful attack shall be estimated, 
which is represented by the threat level (TL) rating. This rating is based on the 
estimation of the following four parameters: (a) the expertise required by an attacker, 
(b) the attacker's required knowledge about the target system, (c) the given window of 
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opportunity to mount an attack, and (d) the equipment and tools required to mount the 
attack. The system-level threat model shall be used as a supportive tool to estimate and 
justify the threat level classification. 
 
 
Figure 11: Classification of the threat level rating and the resulting security level 
The left part of Figure 11 shows the classification and justification of the threat 
level rating linked to the tampering threat associated with the ADAS steering angle 
request message (i.e., the asset). The right part of Figure 11 shows the resulting security 
level rating that is a combination of the threat level and impact level. The security level 
rating describes the cybersecurity risk associated with a given asset/threat pair. For each 
applicable threat, a cybersecurity goal shall be defined. This cybersecurity goal defines 
the high-level cybersecurity properties that shall be implemented to reduce the risk of 
the identified threats. The pair of security level and cybersecurity goal can be 
considered similar to the concept of the ASIL rating and safety goal pair known from 
automotive safety engineering.  
Cybersecurity goals can be translated to high-level cybersecurity requirements that 
shall reduce the cybersecurity risk by preventing the exploitation of potential threats. It 
should be noted that the assessment of several asset/threat pairs may result in the 
definition of similar cybersecurity goals. The cybersecurity requirements derived from 
such cybersecurity goals shall inherit the highest determined cybersecurity level 
associated with these cybersecurity goals. 
3 Cybersecurity Requirements Elicitation and Traceability 
Cybersecurity requirements arise from cybersecurity goals and customer demands, 
such as the BMW group standard GS 95014 or the VW KGAS standard state 
requirements for cyber-security (and functional safety) engineering. These 
requirements can include functional and non-functional requirements, which can also 
be related to specific development processes to, e.g., ensure compliance with 
automotive (cybersecurity) standards. Such demands shall be integrated into the 
project's requirements management system as cybersecurity customer requirements. 
The cybersecurity goals identified within the TARA depict an essential source to 
establish a common understanding of cybersecurity between customer and supplier, 
which is considered especially important at the beginning of a project. Therefore, the 
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cybersecurity goals shall be aligned with the customer and subsequently management 
like customer requirements. To ensure traceability between requirements and design 
decision, the cybersecurity customer requirements shall be linked to the cybersecurity 
goals and the intermediate work products used to support the TARA process. In an 
Automotive SPICE-aligned development process, typically, a template for 
requirements specification is used. This template shall be extended to include relevant 
cybersecurity attributes such as the cybersecurity goal identifier and the security level. 
These attributes can support prioritizing cybersecurity-related development activities 
and can be used to demonstrate the coverage of cybersecurity requirements, e.g., during 
a homologation assessment [Ekert et.al. 2020]. 
A link/traceability model is exemplifying in Figure 12. The model shows the trace 
links between work products created during system analysis and the requirements 
derived from the analysis results (i.e., the work products). The numbers in green circles 
indicate the cybersecurity engineering workflow steps. The red lines indicate links and 
traceability identifiers between the steps. The first four steps are explained in Section 
2. The remaining steps are explained in the following. Before that, a summary of the 
requirements elicitation workflow steps is given: 
1. The asset shall be identified using brainstorming and system modeling, as 
described in Section 2.1. 
2. Threats to assets shall be identified and analyzed using threat modeling 
techniques. In addition, the risks associated with these threats shall be 
assessed, as described in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2. 
3. Cybersecurity goals shall be derived from the TARA (i.e., steps 1 and 2), as 
described in Section 2.2. 
4. Customer cybersecurity requirements shall be derived from cybersecurity 
goals and the customer's requirements specification, as described in Section 3. 
5. Cybersecurity customer requirements shall be refined/translated to (technical) 
cybersecurity system requirements. 
6. HW/SW functions that affect system cybersecurity (e.g., sending/receiving 
data from the bus, cryptographic algorithms) shall be identified. These 
functions are subsequently denoted as security-critical functions (SCF).  
7. The purpose of each function is to processes information/data. Suppose the 
information/data processed by a SCF affects system cybersecurity, such as 
cryptographic material, configuration data, and bus messages. In that case, this 
information/data shall be considered as security-critical data/information 
(SCD) and linked to the SCF that is processing the SCD. 
8. Each SCD shall be linked to its SCFs processing the SCD and vice versa. 
9. HW/SW cybersecurity objectives shall be assigned to the SCF and SCD 
elements. The assignment of the cybersecurity objectives can be used to 
identify weaknesses in the system and its design by comparing the assigned 
cybersecurity objectives with the SUD's cybersecurity properties determined 
by the cybersecurity goals identified during the TARA. The identified 
weaknesses shall drive the improvement of the system design and elicitation 
of HW/SW requirements. 
10. Appropriate security design patterns and mitigation techniques shall be 
identified and integrated into the system design to address identified 
weaknesses. These patterns and techniques shall be documented as HW/SW 
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requirements and linked to the corresponding SCD and SCF elements that shall 
implement the cybersecurity properties achieved through a specific pattern. 
11. Attack patterns describe strategies and techniques used in known cybersecurity 
attacks. These attack patterns can be used to support the derivation of 
appropriate design patterns and mitigation techniques against known attacks. 
12. Cybersecurity design patterns and attack patterns can be used for systematic 
security test derivation based on known attacks and exploits targeted explicitly 
towards the SUD and its implemented mitigation techniques. 
 
Figure 12: Link/traceability model including cybersecurity requirements and work 
products from cybersecurity analysis 
In the following, the SCU example is continued with workflow step 5, i.e., the 
refinement of cybersecurity customer requirements to (technical) cybersecurity system 
requirements. At this stage, cybersecurity goals have been defined and linked to assets. 
In addition, these goals have been integrated into the requirements management system 
as cybersecurity customer requirements. These steps relate to the entries one to four in 
Table 2, which provides an excerpt of dependent work products and requirements. 
In the example given, the ADAS steering angle request is classified as a high-risk 
asset. The high-level security goal SecG_01 is defined to address this risk. Next, the 
security goal is split into two customer requirements and their corresponding system 
requirements Sys_01 and Sys_02. Following the workflow steps 7 to 10, the SCF and 
SCD elements shall be identified next. The SCF and SCD elements are intended to 
support the system analysis and requirements elicitation process. Hence, these elements 
are not necessarily requirements describing the implementation of specific 
mechanisms. Instead, these elements can also be high-level concepts, functions, 
techniques, and information that can be used to build a structured argument for design 
decisions. Based on such an argumentation, the (detailed) HW/SW design shall be 
developed and the corresponding requirements can be derived, i.e., steps 9 and 10. 
These steps are explained more explicitly in the following paragraphs. 
Table 2 states that the reading of messages from the vehicle bus is identified as 
security-critical function SCF_01. To meet Sys_01, critical vehicle bus messages must 
be authenticated in a secure manner, which results in the definition of the software 
requirement SW_Req_01 stating that the standard AUTOSAR interfaces shall be used 
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for message authentication. In addition, hardware requirements one and two are defined 
to ensure proper support for the implementation of cryptographic algorithms (e.g., the 
secure message authentication algorithm) on the hardware level. 
A similar approach is applied to derive the HW/SW requirements implementing 
the system requirement Sys_02, which states that vehicle bus messages shall be 
securely logged to ensure the non-repudiation property (i.e., SCF_02). To that purpose, 
every vehicle bus message (i.e., SCD_01) is embedded into a log entry (i.e., SCD_02), 
which shall be written to an in-memory first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue (i.e., 
SW_Req_02). This FIFO queue shall only be stored to the secure flash memory at every 
system shut down to prevent the destruction of the flash memory due to heavy usage 
(i.e., SW_Req_03). To ensure that the content of the FIFO queue is written to flash 
memory even under harsh conditions (e.g., loss of power supply), the hardware security 
module (HSM) shall provide hardware-accelerated writing to the flash memory (i.e., 
HW_Req_03). 
 
# Type Description 
1 Asset ADAS Steering Angle Request (part of asset group 1, i.e., the input 
messages received via the vehicle bus) 
2 SecL High 
3 Security 
Goal 
SecG_01: Prevent unwanted steering due to unauthorized commands and 




Cus_01: Prevent unintended steering due to unauthorized commands 





Sys_01: Security-critical messages received via the vehicle-bus shall be 
authenticated to ensure message integrity 
Sys_02: Security-critical messages received via the vehicle-bus shall be 
securely logged to ensure non-repudiation 





SCF_01: Read critical message from the vehicle bus 
SCF_02: Secure logging of critical vehicle bus 
SW_Req_01: Use the AUTOSAR Secure On-board Com. (SOC) runtime 
interface to validate the authenticity of security-critical vehicle bus messages 
HW_Req_01: The hardware security module (HSM) shall provide a secure 
storage to ensure confidentiality of stored cryptographic key material. 
HW_Req_02: The HSM shall provide a secure execution zone (trust zone) 
for critical cryptographic algorithms, e.g., to ensure confidentiality of keys. 





SCD_01: Steering angle request signal embedded into a particular vehicle 
bus message 
SCD_02: Vehicle bus message log entry incl. the steering angle request  
SW_Req_02: Critical vehicle bus messages shall be written into an in-
memory FIFO queue that is stored in the secure flash memory on shut down. 
SW_Req_03: The in-memory FIFO queue shall be capable of holding 
messages received within a 2 second time windows (i.e., to store messages 
received between +/- 1000 ms). 
HW_Req_03: The HSM shall support hardware-accelerated reading/writing 
to secure flash memory. 
Table 2: Example of associated analysis results and requirements. The cybersecurity 
properties to be achieved are highlighted through underlining 
The described example should demonstrate how the above-defined workflow can 
be used to build traceable arguments to support design decisions and elicit related 
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requirements in a structured manner. The workflow steps 9 to 12 are intended to support 
the requirements elicitation process by providing guidance in identifying design 
weaknesses and selecting appropriate cybersecurity measures and techniques 
addressing these weaknesses to meet the desired system cybersecurity properties (i.e., 
the security goals).  
To identify design weaknesses (i.e., step 9), first, the cybersecurity properties 
provided by the current system design shall be identified and assigned to the SCF and 
SCD elements. It is recommended to use system and threat models for the identification 
of these properties. Second, the cybersecurity objectives (i.e., the desired system 
cybersecurity properties) shall be assigned to the SCF and SCD elements. The assigned 
desired and provided properties shall be compared to identify gaps/weaknesses in the 
system design in the third step. 
So far, it has been discussed how cybersecurity properties can be used for the 
systematic and traceable identification of design weaknesses. In step 10, cybersecurity 
properties are used to improve system security through the systematic selection of 
security design patterns based on the cybersecurity properties the system shall meet. 
This approach is similar to the one proposed in [Scan. 2008], where patterns are selected 
to achieve specific cybersecurity properties. Table 3 shows an excerpt of such security 
design patterns (i.e., high-level security controls) that can be used for implementing a 
specific cybersecurity property on a particular system level. Some of these security 
controls are already discussed above, such as control-flow integrity (i.e., Sys_01 and 
related requirements), secure storage, and encryption of data at rest (i.e., Sys_02 and 
related requirements). 
Summing up, by selecting appropriate security design patterns and mitigation 
mechanisms, the security of the SUD can be improved. In addition, the patterns can 
support the elicitation of proper HW/SW security requirements and security test 
scenarios in a structured and traceable manner (see Figure 12). 
Table 3: Example for security design patterns and security controls applicable at 





Vehicle Level  
Security Control 
Component Level  
Security Control 




TLS, IPsec, etc. 
- Functional 
separation and 
trusted execution of 
the control flow 
- Access control 
- Control-flow integrity 
- Trust anchor 
Authenticity - Access control to dev. 






- Secure boot with a 
trust anchor, e.g., 
public key hash in OTP 
fuses 
Availability - Intrusion detection 









Confidentiality - Access control to 
documentation 
- Encryption of 
data in flight 
- TLS, IPsec, etc. 
- Encryption of data at 
rest 
- Secure storage 
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4 Cybersecurity Prospects on Hardware and Software 
The previous section discusses the process of systematic cybersecurity systems and 
requirements engineering, which includes the derivation of appropriate cybersecurity 
controls to meet specific cybersecurity goals. This section briefly discusses how 
cybersecurity controls, such as those provided in Table 3, are integrated into a typical 
AUTOSAR-based system stack commonly used within automotive embedded systems. 
Figure 13 shows such a system stack, which is structured into multiple layers. The 
bottom layer consists of the hardware elements for code execution, data storage, and 
connectivity. The hardware security module (HSM) is also located on this layer. The 
HSM provides hardware support to securely store and access private key material, 
which is essential for adequately implementing various higher-level security controls. 
In addition, an HSM may also provide hardware-accelerated cryptographic algorithms 
that can be leveraged to meet the stringent real-time requirements of automotive 
networked systems, even if secure protection of cyclic communication in the 
millisecond and sub-millisecond ranges is required. 
 
Figure 13: AUTOSAR-based layered HW/SW stack 
Like other hardware components, the HSM can be integrated into the software 
stack via a driver located at the microcontroller abstraction layer (MCAL). In Figure 
13, this driver is denoted as virtual HSM (vHSM). Suppose there is no dedicated 
hardware HSM available. In that case, the HSM functionality can be emulated in 
software. Therefore, the vHSM can forward service requests to the software-based 
846    
 
Dobaj J., Ekert D., Stolfa J., Stolfa S., Macher G., Messnarz R.: Cybersecurity Threat ... 
HSM implementation located, e.g., at the complex driver layer. It is important to note 
that the software-based HSM approach is less secure than using a dedicated HSM. 
An application (e.g., App 1) can access dedicated cryptographic services of the 
HSM via the runtime environment (RTE) layer that specifies the interface to the crypto 
service manager (CSM). The RTE forwards service requests from the application to the 
system services and the CSM that are located at the AUTOSAR core operating system 
(OS) layer.  
Besides accessing the HSM directly via the RTE, it is also possible to configure 
the communication services located at the AUTOSAR OS layer, to manage HSM 
service usage for establishing secure on-board communication (SecOC) sessions. In 
this case, the SecOC services are configured to, e.g., check and ensure the authenticity 
of specific messages, making the HSM-based security mechanism transparent to the 
application layer. 
Besides the HSM, several other components and security controls are leveraged to 
ensure system security. For example, implementing a secure boot process shall ensure 
the integrity of the overall software system, including system firmware and persistent 
data. To that purpose, a so-called trust anchor can be established during the EoL 
production process (see also Section 1) by, e.g., storing a public key hash (PKH) of the 
primary bootloader within the OTP fuses of the microcontroller. At every system boot, 
the microcontroller first uses the PKH to verify the integrity of the bootloader. The boot 
process only continues if the integrity of the bootloader can be verified, i.e., that the 
bootloader has not been manipulated. In the subsequent boot-stages, firmware and data 
can be verified by checking the validity of their signature using, for example, the key 
material stored within the HSM during the EoL production process. 
5 Conclusion 
Currently, the integration of cybersecurity into the automotive industry's development 
processes is in its early stages, and there is no generally accepted state of the art yet. 
The upcoming ISO/SAE 21434 standard is an essential step in this direction. However, 
at the current stage, the ISO/SAE 21434 provides only rough guidance on how such 
development processes could be designed. Therefore, this article attempts to provide 
actionable steps and methods to help engineers integrate secure system design 
techniques and systematic cybersecurity requirement elicitation approaches into their 
established development processes. This work uses a case study to demonstrate the 
application of the proposed steps and methods on the example of an electric power 
steering system. The case study and workflow presented have been derived from 
practical expert knowledge combined with results from previous research that has been 
adapted to the domain of automotive systems engineering. Our future work consists of 
validating and refining the presented approach in further projects and feeding back the 
results and insights into the different standardization working groups. In addition, we 
aim to develop a generic security-driven development lifecycle model that can be used 
for the development of current and future automotive electronic systems and 
architectures. 
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